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The idea of an industrial policy that promotes large businesses—heavyweights—as the best 
way to compete in a globalized world has become, again, en vogue among European 
politicians. The only apparent controversy about the idea revolves around whether it is better 
to promote national champions or, instead, European champions. Empirical evidence on the 
issue is rare and contradictory. A uniquely rich industry-level dataset for Germany is used in 
this paper to test whether large business size in an industry fosters growth in terms of total 
factor productivity (TFP). The results suggest that the overall effects of firm size on TFP 
growth are negative. 
JEL Code: L11, L16, O33, O40. 
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1. Introduction 
In boxing, the heavyweight class has been variously defined over time. In the 19th century, 
for example, many heavyweight champions weighed around 170 pounds. In 1920, the 
minimum weight for a heavyweight was set at 175 pounds. Today, for most boxing 
organizations, the minimum weight for a heavyweight is 201 pounds. 
More or less the same is true for industrial heavyweights. The 20th century gave birth to the 
first traditional industrial heavyweights (for an overview, see Heblich, 2007). During this 
century, firms grew larger due to the realization of economies of scale and scope, a situation 
that led to industries characterized by mass production and a highly vertical form of 
integration. The economic historian Gerschenkron (1962) argues that in such a situation 
relatively backward economies, such as Germany or France during the 19th century, could 
rapidly reduce their Gerschenkronian backwardness by large investments and technological 
imitation. Further, long-term relationships, high average firm size and firm age, and little firm 
selection was supposed to be especially favorable to productivity growth. In such a situation, 
firms can best appropriate rents realized by their investments and imitation. 
As economic wealth rose and markets became increasingly saturated with consumer goods, 
customers started demanding more individualized products, a process nicely illustrated by an 
example from the U.S. shirt production industry. Until the 1960s, men’s shirts were a basic 
commodity and 70% of all shirts produced were white and of the same cut. By 1986, the 
market share of standardized white shirts had decreased to 20% (Abernathy et al., 1999). 
Within a span of 20 years, uniformity was out, individuality in. This led to a change in 
production processes as individualized customer requirements could not be met with 
standardized mass production. Smaller batch numbers were produced and former economies   3
of scale vanished. Manufacturers vertically disaggregated their production and started relying 
more on suppliers instead of producing everything themselves. 
The 1970s are thought to be the best decade ever in heavyweight boxing—Muhammad Ali 
returned in 1970 from his forced retirement to take on Joe Frazier, who was world champion 
at the time. However, recent times have not been as favorable for industrial heavyweight 
champions. These days, to compete on the global technology frontier, further productivity 
growth can be realized only by pure innovation, not by imitation. In such a technologically 
advanced economy, the market selection process and firm turnover resulting from a process of 
creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1934) are the ultimate bases of innovation and, thus, 
productivity growth. Industries are now characterized by short-term relationships, younger 
firms, and less investment—changes modeled by Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zillibotti. (2002). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
theoretical arguments both in favor of and against large firms—the heavyweights—in an 
innovation-based economy. Section 3 reviews the literature on the relationship of firm size 
distribution and productivity growth. Section 4 is dedicated to an empirical analysis. Section 5 
contains a summary and draws some conclusions. 
2.  The Impact of Firm Size on Productivity Growth in an 
Innovation-Based Economy 
2.1. Productive  Innovation 
“Nowadays, nobody would question that a positive relationship exists between … innovation 
on the one side and country-level performance … on the other” (Brusoni, Cefis, and 
Orsenigo, 2007). However, there is disagreement over whether large firms are more or less 
innovative than their smaller counterparts. Could it be that large firms are simply innovative 
in a different way than that of their smaller counterparts? Basically, all arguments in favor and   4
against large businesses being more innovative or innovative in a different way than their 
smaller counterparts refer to the ability of coping with uncertainty related to innovation and 
the internal (within an organization) and external (within the market) appropriability of post-
innovative benefits. 
Generally, a business’s decision to innovate involves a high degree of uncertainty. Knight 
(1921, p. 231) remarks that such decisions “deal with situations which are far too unique, 
generally speaking, for any sort of statistical tabulation to have any value for guidance.” 
Against this background, Schumpeter (1942) basically argues that large businesses can better 
handle this uncertainty as they have more internal financial resources and more collateral 
assets with which to raise external funds and thus are more successful in dealing with the 
Knightian uncertainty related to innovation. By raising enough resources to establish large 
specialized research laboratories, large businesses manage, over time, to change innovation 
from being a sequence of fortuitous occurrences into a business-like activity that can be relied 
upon and is reasonably predictable (Baumol 2002, p. 55). 
However, even if, in principle, large businesses can better handle this uncertainty, the 
organizational structure of large businesses is often assumed to be unsupportive of innovation. 
Acs et al. (1997) argue that an innovator in a large firm often has only limited property rights 
in his or her innovation. The new product or process generally belongs to the firm, not the 
employee who invented it. Thus, even in organizations with performance-oriented 
remuneration systems, the employee must share the returns from his or her innovative effort 
with many other employees, even if these others are not specifically associated with the 
innovation. Further, Bénabou and Tirole (2003) argue that rewards on “engagement” 
(innovative activity) have only a limited impact and possibly even a negative impact on “re-
engagement.” This second phenomenon may be the result of the employee’s interest in   5
protecting the cash flow generated by his or her old innovations (cf. Acs, Morck, and Yeung, 
1999). 
Furthermore, on the firm level, the appropriability of innovative rents may also depend on 
firm size and the firm’s market share. Cohen and Klepper (1996a, b) present a model of firm 
size and the nature of innovation. They distinguish between product and process innovation. 
Process innovations increase the firm’s price-cost margin by lowering the average cost of 
production. If the firm does not license process innovations, the only way the firm can benefit 
from the process innovations is in its own output. The higher the volume of production, the 
higher the total gross benefit of the process innovation. Hence, larger firms are able to derive 
a higher return from a process innovation than are smaller firms simply because the larger 
firms can spread this benefit over a greater volume. The same is not obvious for product 
innovation resulting in ground-breaking new products that create a completely new market. If 
there are no strong reasons for believing that the volume of sales on the new market is related 
to ex-ante size, there is obviously no reason why large businesses should spend relatively 
more time or money on product innovation than do their smaller counterparts. 
In conclusion, from a theoretical perspective, a priori, there is no evidence on whether large 
firms are more innovative—and thus more prone to productivity growth—than their smaller 
counterparts. Nevertheless, they do perform relatively more process innovation than product 
innovation. 
2.2. Unproductive  Innovation—Rent  Seeking 
Baumol (2002) warns against assuming that all innovation is productive per se and thus 
enhances productivity growth. There may be activities that are highly innovative but 
nevertheless make little or no contribution to the real output of the economy. In this context, 
Baumol discusses innovative rent seeking. Rent seeking is any activity whose objective is the   6
acquisition of economic rents that are available in the economy but that would be allocated to 
someone else in the absence of rent seeking. The most obvious example of this is when an 
incumbent firm finds a new way to persuade politicians or a regulatory agency to impose 
barriers to market entry so that the incumbent can skim additional rents. 
Krueger (1974), Helpman and Grossman (2002), Rajan and Zingales (2003), and Morck, 
Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) emphasize that large incumbent firms are especially prone to 
invest in political rent seeking as a means of locking in the status quo. These firms are often 
assisted in this endeavor by politicians who also prefer the status quo, especially when 
seeking reelection. Roe (2003) argues that governments might lock in the status quo to please 
voters who prefer slow but smooth growth over faster but erratic growth. In this situation, one 
would not be too surprised to find a “save the lame ducks” campaign. “Lame ducks” are 
incumbent firms that were once at the front lines but have now fallen far behind. However, 
they are “too big to fail” (Vives, 2001) as their failure might have serious negative effects on 
employment in the short run. However, the “death” of a large business can have long-term 
effects on employment too, particularly when the labor market is inflexible and immobile. In 
this situation, state intervention can, at best, merely delay the inevitable, but politicians, who 
usually manage to think short term, especially those up for reelection, may wish to smooth out 
the process of decline and thus ease social tension. 
This “save the lame duck at all costs” phenomenon is also found in the banking sector, as 
reported by Vives (2001). Politicians are apparently very taken with the idea that a national 
champion in the form of a bank must not be allowed to fail as the fallout would have such a 
negative impact on national industry. Particularly large banks are believed to be “too big to 
fail.”   7
Thus, the direction in which innovations are finally canalized—productive or unproductive—
is heavily dependent on a society’s institutions. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) go 
even further and argue that there might be a dynamic feedback loop between weak institutions 
and firm concentration. Weak institutions place sweeping corporate governance powers in the 
hands of a tiny elite group, who will, in turn, lobby on behalf of the weak institutions so as to 
preserve their concentrated control over the nation’s large businesses. 
3.  Survey of the Empirical Literature 
To date, there has been little empirical work analyzing the impact of firm size distribution on 
productivity growth. The four analyses on the industry or economy level that I am aware of 
come to different conclusions. The design and the main results of these four analyses are 
briefly summarized below. 
Acs, Morck, and Yeung (1999) were the first to analyze the impact of firm size distribution in 
an industry on industry-level total factor productivity (TFP). They analyze 1991 cross-
sectional data for 450 4-digit-level U.S. manufacturing industries. They find that industries in 
which larger firms have a greater market share have a higher TFP. Market share is defined as 
employment share or establishment share. Their concentration on U.S. data may be helpful in 
pointing out how productivity growth and firm size distribution may be influenced by 
institutional environment (cf. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005). To control for 
differences in industries, they add industry capital intensity and industry gross value added as 
controls. As TFP is calculated under the assumption of perfect competition and constant 
return to scale, they also control for possible “rents” in the TFP values by interacting the firm 
size distribution variables with indicators for competition intensity, such as firm turbulence 
or, again, capital intensity. However, they do not find “rents” in the TFP measure.   8
Carree and Thurik (1998, 1999) analyze 13 manufacturing industries in 12 European 
countries for the period 1990 to 1995. They regress growth of real value added from 1990 to 
1993, to 1994, or to 1995 on large-firm presence in the year 1994. To control for country 
differences in the industry size distributions, they add GDP per capita index as an interaction 
term. Furthermore, they estimate the regression in differences from the overall industry 
means. Their results indicate that an industry with a low large-firm presence relative to the 
same industries in other countries has performed better, on average, in terms of growth of 
value added. 
Pagano and Schivardi (2003) analyze the impact of firm size distribution in 22 industries 
(manufacturing, services, and construction) across eight European countries. Their analysis 
clearly shows that intra-industry size differences between countries are quite important. This 
finding underlines the importance of institutions for productivity and firm size distribution. 
Furthermore, they find positive effects of size in 1994 on per capita GDP growth between 
1994 and 1998. However, this positive effect disappears when controlling for country-specific 
effects. As Pagano and Schivardi (2003) theorize that the positive effect of firm size 
distribution on growth is mainly driven indirectly via the positive effects large firms exert on 
innovation, they interact firm size distribution with input-oriented innovation indicators, such 
as the share of personnel employed in R&D, R&D expenditure over investment, or R&D 
expenditure over value added in an industry. They find that size matters for growth only 
through its influence on innovation. 
The most recent analysis, by Fogel, Morck, and Yeung (2006), differs from the ones 
discussed above in two ways. First, the analysis is at the country level, not at the industry 
level. Second, and more important, it takes a very long perspective by analyzing the effects of 
big business stability in 44 countries during the period 1975 to 1996 (data are available for the   9
years 1975 and 1996) on economic growth (real per capita GDP growth or TFP growth) in the 
period 1990 to 2000. To control for differences in the countries under consideration, the 
authors add to their model the country’s income level, physical capital stock, and human 
capital stock. Furthermore, they implement several controls for institutional differences in the 
countries. These controls range from the size of the government sector to indicators for the 
functioning of the financial system to the openness of a country. Their results suggest that 
countries with larger big business stability from 1975 to 1996 exhibited slower economic 
growth in the 1990s. 
In summary, the results of these four studies suggest that the more “cross-section” in nature 
the data are (Acs et al., 1999), the more likely it is that the impact of large firms on economic 
growth will be found to be positive. In contrast, data of a more “time-series” nature (Fogel, 
Morck, and Yeung, 2006) lead to the result that the impact of large firms on economic growth 
is negative. This insight motivates the analyses presented below, which is based on an 
industry-level time-series dataset spanning 21 German manufacturing industries over the time 
period 1991 to 2004. 
4. Empirical  Work 
4.1. Data 
The data are at the industry level and cover 21 manufacturing industries over the timespan 
1991 to 2004. The data are the result of a merger of the Ifo Industry Growth Accounting 
Database (cf. Roehn, Eicher, and Strobel, 2007), the Ifo Innovation Survey (cf. Penzkofer, 
2004), and the establishment file of the German Social Security Statistics (cf. Brixy and 
Fritsch, 2004). Each of these datasets is a source of rich information on its own—the 
cumulative effect should be a much more vivid and accurate picture of German industry 
development.   10
Information on productivity growth in terms of total factor productivity (TFP) growth is 
gleaned from the Ifo Industry Growth Accounting Database. By decomposing industry-level 
value-added (VA) growth, one can derive TFP growth as a residual: 
t i t i t i L t i t i K t i TFP L K VA , , , , , , , , ln ln ln ln Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ υ υ      (1) 
where  t i K ,  and  t i L , denote capital services and adjusted labor of industry i in period t. The 
two-period average nominal input shares of capital and labor are  t i K , , υ  and  t i L , , υ , respectively. 
Capital services are flows of services by which each capital asset type contributes to the 
production process. The Ifo Industry Growth Accounting Database distinguishes 12 assets, 
which are derived by the perpetual inventory method. The 12 assets include three ICT assets 
(Computer and Office Equipment; Communication Equipment; Software), eight additional 
equipment assets (Metal Products; Machinery; Electrical Generation and Distribution; 
Instruments, Optics, and Watches; Furniture, Music, and Sports Equipment; Other Machines 
and Equipment; Automobiles; Other Vehicles), and investments in Buildings and Structures. 
Data on quality adjusted labor at the industry level are taken from the Groningen Industry 
Level Growth Accounting Database. 
Industry-specific innovation activities of firms can be derived from the Ifo Innovation Survey. 
More than 1,000 surveyed firms report yearly whether or not they have introduced an 
innovation, i.e., product or process innovation. As the number of employees reported by the 
surveyed firms and the size distribution of firms in a respective industry are known, a 
projection of the survey data across the population is possible. The Ifo Innovation Survey thus 
makes it possible to derive indicators for the product and process innovation intensity in an 
industry.   11
The German Social Insurance Statistics requires all employers to report information about 
every employee who is subject to obligatory social insurance. The information collected can 
be transformed into an establishment file that provides longitudinal information about the 
establishments and their employees. Thus, one can derive information on the establishment 
size distribution (in terms of employment) in an industry. Furthermore, as each establishment 
with at least one employee subject to social security has a permanent individual code number, 
it is possible to identify business start ups and closures. The appearance of a new code 
number can be interpreted as a startup; the disappearance of a code number can be interpreted 
as a closure. Businesses without employees are not included. The unit of measurement is the 
“establishment,” not the company. The empirical data thus derived include two categories of 
entities: firm headquarters and subsidiaries. In the following analysis, the term business is 
used for both entities. 
The industry-level variables are summarized in Table 1. Tables 2a through 2c display some 
descriptive statistics of the variables in use. 12 
Table 1: Industry-Level Variables 
Variable  Definition 
Source 
TFP growth  Residual from the decomposition of yearly value-added growth 
Ifo Industry Growth Accounting Database 
Value-added  Additional value created in an industry 
German Federal Statistical Office 
Capacity utilization 
index 
Relation of actual value-added to the trend component of value-added 
(Hodrick-Prescott Filter with  100 = λ ) 
Share of large business 
employment 
Number of employees in businesses with at least 1,000 employees over the 
number of employees in all businesses in an industry 
Establishment File of the German Social Insurance Statistics 
Change of share of 
large business 
employment 
Yearly change of the share of large business employment 
Establishment File of the German Social Insurance Statistics 
Capital intensity 
Capital stock over employees subject to social security 
Ifo Industry Growth Accounting Database and German Social Insurance 
Statistics 
Turbulence rate  Sum of number of startups and closures over the number of existing businesses 
Establishment File of the German Social Insurance Statistics 
Share of product 
innovators 
Number of product innovating businesses over number of all businesses in an 
industry 
Ifo Innovation Survey 
Share of process 
innovators 
Number of process innovating businesses over number of all businesses in an 
industry 
Ifo Innovation Survey 13 
Table 2a: Descriptive Statistics, 1991–2004 
TFP Growth (%)  Value Added (millions)  Capacity Utilization Index  Industries 
Mean Max  Min  Std.Dev.  Mean Max  Min  Std.Dev.  Mean Max  Min  Std.Dev. 
Food and Tobacco  -1.43  6.99  -13.49  5.56  35.28  39.14  33.57  1.51  1.00  1.06  0.96  0.03 
Textiles  1.38 8.29 -9.00 4.49  6.24 8.65 4.91  1.19  1.00 1.05 0.91  0.05 
Apparel  4.22  11.18  0.60  3.28  3.57 5.22 2.78  0.74  1.00 1.09 0.93  0.05 
Leather  2.47  16.80  -4.86 5.96  1.23 1.72 0.96  0.25  1.00 1.09 0.92  0.05 
Wood  Products  2.21  12.41  -8.37 5.43  7.67 8.30 6.50  0.51  1.00 1.08 0.90  0.05 
Paper,  Pulp  1.41  11.64  -15.77 6.96  9.25 9.86 7.93  0.52  1.00 1.06 0.88  0.05 
Publishing, Printing  -0.33  13.55  -6.89  5.34  23.06  25.21  19.77  1.64  1.00  1.08  0.94  0.03 
Coke, Petroleum, Nuclear 
Fuels  -16.44 115.87  -240.39  92.78  10.97  51.41  1.51  12.57  1.12  2.39  0.20  0.69 
Chemicals 4.31  9.38  -0.93  2.85  39.28  47.46  33.97  4.26  1.00  1.03  0.95  0.02 
Rubber, Plastic  1.67  5.71  -2.93  2.55  18.83  21.66  16.70  1.52  1.00  1.03  0.97  0.02 
Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products  2.13 7.28 -1.25 2.63 15.67  16.83  14.81 0.65  1.00 1.06 0.96  0.03 
Basic Metals  3.53  12.00  -6.95  5.21  16.24  18.15  14.21  1.07  1.00  1.06  0.92  0.04 
Fabricated Metal Products  1.10  7.15  -7.80  4.04  36.50  39.50  33.65  1.99  1.00  1.06  0.94  0.03 
Machinery 1.27  9.10  -6.15  4.02  61.42  69.51  57.62  3.29  1.00  1.09  0.93  0.04 
Office Machinery and 
Computers  27.18  44.60  0.48 16.43 3.60  11.92  0.70  3.80  1.03 1.25 0.83  0.13 
Electrical Apparatus n.e.c.  1.29  7.92  -15.92  7.27  30.39  33.31  27.98  1.96  1.00  1.11  0.93  0.05 
Radio, TV, and Comm. 
Equipment  6.67 25.65  -15.63 14.00 10.55  18.26 6.81  3.05  0.99  1.24  0.72  0.16 
Instruments, Optics, and 
Watches  1.66 14.63  -11.49 6.76  15.45  17.42  13.51  1.38  1.00  1.11  0.92  0.06 
Motor Vehicles  0.22  13.28  -17.08  9.06  52.06  60.41  42.41  5.41  1.00  1.10  0.87  0.07 
Other Transport Equipment  4.05  22.48  -13.84  11.81  7.05  9.69  4.23  1.89  1.00  1.24  0.72  0.15 
Furniture and Manufacturing 
n.e.c  -1.17 4.61 -8.51  3.88 12.29  15.58 9.17  1.97  1.00 1.07 0.93  0.05 
All 2.26  115.87  -240.39  21.85  19.84  69.51  0.70  16.63  1.01  2.39  0.20  0.16 14 
Table 2b: Descriptive Statistics, 1991–2004 
Share of Large Business Employment (%)  Change of Share of Large Business 
Employment (%)  Capital Intensity (millions per employee)  Industries 
Mean Max  Min  Std.Dev.  Mean Max  Min  Std.Dev.  Mean Max  Min  Std.Dev. 
Food and Tobacco  5.21  6.78  4.16  1.10  -0.13  0.93  -1.02  0.44  0.09  0.10  0.06  0.01 
Textiles 6.52  10.55  4.59  2.10  -0.29  1.18  -2.48  0.89  0.09  0.12  0.04  0.02 
Apparel 2.60  4.98  0.00  1.50  -0.23  1.29  -1.60  0.95  0.03  0.06  0.01  0.01 
Leather  3.92 7.07 2.20  1.41  0.34 1.61 -1.59 0.89  0.06 0.09 0.03  0.01 
Wood  Products  5.67 8.43 3.40  1.70  0.39 1.96 -3.32 1.46  0.05 0.07 0.03  0.01 
Paper, Pulp  11.54  14.40  7.17  2.32  -0.54  0.78  -1.40  0.61  0.12  0.14  0.08  0.02 
Publishing,  Printing  9.07  12.96  6.27  1.80  0.22 1.76 -1.52 1.06  0.07 0.09 0.04  0.02 
Coke, Petroleum, Nuclear 
Fuels  42.02  58.90  28.32  7.18 0.92  30.58  -8.05 9.88 0.35  0.40  0.23 0.06 
Chemicals 49.61  61.17  44.00  5.68  -0.45  7.77  -3.75  3.05  0.14  0.18  0.09  0.03 
Rubber, Plastic  15.91  20.34  13.57  2.05  -0.29  1.27  -3.68  1.23  0.06  0.07  0.04  0.01 
Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products  14.96  24.29  8.67  5.12  0.53 5.40 -5.45 3.22  0.10 0.13 0.06  0.02 
Basic Metals  21.11  30.15  17.66  3.91  -0.36  4.45  -3.72  2.17  0.09  0.10  0.06  0.01 
Fabricated Metal Products  10.09  15.25  7.54  2.23  -0.37  2.85  -2.44  1.21  0.05  0.06  0.03  0.01 
Machinery 20.98  28.65  18.54  2.89  -0.18  5.22  -4.23  2.15  0.05  0.06  0.03  0.01 
Office Machinery and 
Computers  30.96 44.11 22.45  6.52  -0.46  7.81 -16.39  7.05  0.15  0.18  0.09  0.03 
Electrical  Apparatus  n.e.c. 38.18  43.82  35.50 2.58  0.21 4.44 -3.91 2.17  0.07 0.09 0.05  0.01 
Radio, TV, and Comm. 
Equipment  38.05  43.82  34.25 2.86  0.22 4.44 -3.91 2.59  0.07 0.11 0.04  0.02 
Instruments, Optics, and 
Watches  13.24 17.98 11.07  2.53  -0.33  1.45  -3.07  1.14  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.00 
Motor Vehicles  49.95  53.46  48.47  1.59  -0.32  0.94  -2.23  0.97  0.10  0.12  0.08  0.01 
Other Transport Equipment  70.58  85.94  59.69  7.85  1.84  14.23  -7.57  5.84  0.07  0.09  0.04  0.02 
Furniture and Manufacturing 
n.e.c  3.24 3.87 2.37  0.49  0.09 0.96 -0.29 0.34  0.06 0.08 0.04  0.01 
All  22.07  85.94  0.00 19.06 0.04  30.58  -16.39 3.26  0.09 0.40 0.01  0.07 15 
Table 2c: Descriptive Statistics, 1991–2004 
Turbulence Rate (‰)  Share of Product Innovators (%)  Share of Process Innovators (%)  Industries 
Mean  Max Min  Std.Dev.  Mean  Max Min  Std.Dev.  Mean  Max Min  Std.Dev. 
Food  and  Tobacco  107.69  117.72  100.14  6.18  33.83 47.83 26.37  6.13  19.07 27.40  8.89  5.48 
Textiles  153.47  175.92  110.23 16.86  34.74 46.15 23.53  7.14  18.88 33.82 14.00  5.01 
Apparel  225.91  265.39  186.37 19.46  27.08 38.71  6.90  9.33  14.88 31.82  0.00  9.35 
Leather  149.50  181.30  124.48 15.05  38.97 52.38 16.67  9.81  12.81 26.67  0.00  8.08 
Wood  Products  120.99  151.06  84.66  24.89  13.97 28.33  5.66  5.82  15.35 25.00  9.09  4.70 
Paper,  Pulp  114.03  137.36  91.46  14.64  19.26 25.69 10.75  4.37  17.36 22.47  8.60  3.93 
Publishing,  Printing  148.24  171.91  122.96 16.83  12.39 19.35  5.62  4.51  19.72 27.42 11.96  4.71 
Coke, Petroleum, Nuclear 
Fuels  136.15 222.80  76.19  46.40  13.10  33.33  0.00  12.28  8.10  33.33  0.00  11.75 
Chemicals  124.27  141.30  102.30 12.59  51.25 64.71 30.00  8.25  34.99 45.28 24.00  7.10 
Rubber,  Plastic  131.04  157.68  117.44 10.80  32.85 41.89 25.77  5.08  25.67 36.17 16.44  6.05 
Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products  142.67  165.31  128.69 10.26  21.67 27.66 13.33  4.30  19.58 25.86 16.16  3.15 
Basic  Metals  128.52  164.09  111.49 14.84  21.73 48.28  8.70  9.31  23.16 41.38  8.70  9.31 
Fabricated Metal Products  161.63  175.68  138.07  8.67  20.20  28.28  15.04  3.93  20.08  25.52  13.04  3.78 
Machinery  128.19  138.39  111.74  6.61  37.99 42.11 33.23  3.19  24.33 31.32 19.34  3.28 
Office Machinery and 
Computers  212.99 252.44 186.30  21.57  10.00  40.00  0.00  16.49  6.19  33.33  0.00  12.67 
Electrical  Apparatus  n.e.c. 147.46  168.97  135.32  9.41  47.67 59.74 36.80  6.80  33.06 41.03 21.60  6.34 
Radio, TV, and Comm. 
Equipment  171.77  203.92  140.12 23.31  54.44 87.10 34.21  13.00  45.27 59.26 32.35  8.56 
Instruments, Optics, and 
Watches  121.76  155.31  103.44 13.45  48.72 63.16 43.59  5.75  25.72 29.82 19.51  3.04 
Motor  Vehicles  124.96  140.54  105.53 11.86  51.67 69.57 33.33  10.74  38.09 65.22 14.29  16.82 
Other Transport Equipment  182.92  204.50  149.01  15.16  30.88  50.00  12.50  13.37  23.52  50.00  11.11  11.25 
Furniture and Manufacturing 
n.e.c  148.35  169.18  112.03 16.81  40.84 62.03 29.23  9.30  21.41 36.00  8.77  7.83 
All  146.79  265.39  76.19  34.66  31.58 87.10  0.00  16.29  22.25 65.22  0.00  12.12 16 
4.2.  The Impact of Large Businesses on Productivity Growth 
The final dataset consists of 19 manufacturing industries over a period of 14 years. As TFP 
growth in “Coke, Petroleum, Nuclear Fuels” and in “Office Machinery and Computers” 
follows a rather different pattern than that of the other industries (cf. Table 2a), these two 
industries are excluded from all regressions. Along the same lines, Acs, Morck, and Yeung 
(1999, p. 391) point out: “Our results would be ‘cleaner’ if computer related industries were 
taken out of our sample because these industries are known to have productivity trends very 
different from those of other industries.” 
Beck and Katz (2004) call this special type of data, which has a finite and roughly equal 
number of units and number of observations per unit, time-series-cross-section (TSCS). Most 
recent literature has either concentrated on data where the number of units and the number of 
observations per unit are both very large or where the number of units is large and the number 
of observations per unit is small. The first type gave rise to the so-called panel co-integration 
models for heterogeneous panels (cf. Pesaran, Shin, and Smith, 1999). The latter type is 
discussed in the dynamic panel literature (cf. Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 
1998). In the TSCS case, first preference is give to a fixed effects (FE) model with panel 
(White) corrected standard errors (cf. Williams, 2000). The FE model uses the changes in the 
variables over time to estimate the effects of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable. 
In a first step, the relationship between TFP growth and large business presence is estimated, 
where large business presence is calculated as the share of employees in businesses with at 
least 1,000 employees over all employees in an industry and as the yearly change of the share 
of large business employment. A set of control variables is added, e.g., a full set of year 
dummies to capture time-series variation that is common to all industries, an industry-specific 17 
capacity utilization index to control for industry-specific business cycles, or a lagged 
dependent variable to control for serial correlation because it often takes time to adopt 
productivity improving technologies. 
Table 3 displays the results of the first step. Except for Regression IV, all regressions are FE 
models with a full set of year dummies and panel corrected standard errors, as tests for the 
equality of the residuals’ variances by industry clearly suggest that there is a remaining cross-
sectional heteroscedasticity by industry. Regression IV is the only between estimation, i.e., a 
regression run on the means (over time) of the variables. It is the only regression that results 
in a significantly positive impact of large business presence on TFP growth. 
Table 3: Regressions on Total Factor Productivity 
Variable I  II  III  IV 



















N 247  228  247  19 
Adj. R²  0.08  0.08  0.30  0.13 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  ___ 
Period fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  ___ 
White (diagonal) 
corrected standard errors 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 







I–III cross-section-time-series; IV pure cross-section, between estimates. 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Regression I is the basic model. The share of large business employment and its change both 
have a significantly negative impact on TFP growth. An inspection of the serial correlation 
between the lagged residuals shows that even in the basic model there is no remaining partial 
correlation. Hence, there is no obvious necessity to add a dependent lagged variable to reduce 
serial correlation. Inclusion of the lagged dependent variable—Regression II—does not 
change the basic results dramatically. Furthermore, the slope coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable is not significantly different from zero. Basically, one should not 18 
overvalue the results of the FE regressions with the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. 
It is well known that the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in an FE model may cause 
problems because of its correlation with the fixed effects. In this case, Nickell (1981) shows 
that the FE estimator is biased of order 1/T. However, since the time series examined in this 
paper is relatively long, the fixed-effects estimator is more likely to be consistent. 
Inclusion of the capacity utilization index in Regression III to control for industry-specific 
business cycles changes the results in that the coefficient of the share of large business 
employment becomes insignificant, whereas the coefficient of the change of large businesses 
employment share stays significantly negative. The slope coefficient of the capacity 
utilization index is significantly different from zero. 
Regressions were also run with other limit values for the share of large business employment. 
In the case of smaller values (e.g., businesses with at least 500 employees), the results were 
ambiguous. In the case of larger values (e.g., businesses with at least 5,000 employees—the 
“real” heavyweights), there was an increasing number of industries with a zero share of large 
business employment. 
Even in the case of a negative average relationship between large business presence and TFP 
growth, there might be some industries where this relationship is positive. To allow for 
heterogeneity in the relationship between TFP growth and large business presence over 
industry, in a further step the large business variables are interacted with (time-invariant) 
industry characteristics. 
The first candidates for interaction are capital intensity and business turbulence rate. These 
variables might serve as proxies for competition intensity in the industry and, therefore, 
control for the possibility that TFP growth contains “rents.” Acs, Morck, and Yeung (1999) 
argue that TFP growth in industries with more market power may register higher TFP growth 19 
not because they experience higher TFP growth, but because the TFP calculation may include 
rents due to the market power of incumbent firms in the industry. This measurement error 
might than be captured by the large businesses slope coefficient in the basic model. If “rent” 
is the only explanation for the impact of large business presence on TFP growth, the large 
businesses slope coefficient should become zero while the slope coefficient of the interaction 
between large business presence and competition intensity should be significantly different 
from zero. Capital intensity and business turbulence rate enter the model as industry-specific 
means over the entire time period. They therefore represent time-invariant industry 
characteristics. 
Table 4 displays the results of regressions expanded by the interaction of large business 
presence with proxies for competition intensity. In all specifications, the slope coefficient of 
the share of large business employment is significantly different from zero. Calculating the 
point estimates of the effect of large businesses employment share on TFP growth for each 
industry depending on the industry-specific value of capital intensity or the value of the 
turbulence rate, respectively, one sees that in industries with high values of capital intensity 
(at least €0.12 million per employee in the specification without controls) or low values for 
the turbulence rate (maximum 132 net entries per 1,000 incumbent businesses in the 
specification without controls), the industry-specific effect of the share of large business 
employment on TFP growth is positive (e.g., Chemicals or Paper and Pulp). The point 
estimates are the sum of the slope coefficients of the share of large business employment and 
the slope coefficients of the respective interaction term multiplied by the value of capital 
intensity or turbulence rate in an industry. However, it turns out that neither of the positive 
estimates is significantly different from zero assuming a 5% significance level. This clearly 
suggests that the argument that the TFP measure contains “rents” cannot be supported by 
empirical evidence. 20 
Table 4: Regressions on Total Factor Productivity 
Variable  I  II III IV V VI 


























Lagged share of large business employment 







___ ___ ___ 
Change of share of large business 







___ ___ ___ 
Lagged share of large business employment 
* Turbulence rate 






Change of share of large business 
employment * Turbulence rate 






N  247 228 247 247 228 247 
Adj.  R²  0.09 0.09 0.32 0.10 0.10 0.33 
Industry  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
White  (diagonal)  corrected  standard  errors  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 










*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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To test whether large business presence supports TFP growth in innovation-intensive 
industries, the large business variable is interacted with innovation intensity. To allow for 
different types of innovation, large business presence is either interacted with process 
innovation intensity or product innovation intensity. Process innovation intensity and product 
innovation intensity are calculated as industry-specific means over the entire period. Table 5 
displays the results of these regressions. In all specifications except those including the 
capacity utilization index as control, the slope coefficient of large business presence remains 
significantly negative. The slope coefficients of the interaction of large business presence and 
share of product innovators or share of process innovators are generally positive. The 
coefficients for the interaction with share of process innovators are generally higher than the 
coefficients for the interaction with share of product innovators. However, these coefficients 
sometimes turn out to be not significantly different from zero. Calculating the industry-
specific point estimates for the effect of large business presence, there are some innovation-
intensive industries (at least 51 product innovators or 34 process innovators per 100 firms in 
the basic specification without controls) where this effect is positive (e.g., Chemicals, Motor 
Vehicles, and Radio, TV, and Comm. Equipment). Interestingly, Radio, TV, and Comm. 
Equipment is an industry with a high degree of market selection (this industry has one of the 
largest turbulence rates in the sample), whereas Chemicals and Motor Vehicles are both 
industries characterized by very little selection. It might be stiff international competition 
between incumbents with large research laboratories that drives innovation in the latter two 
industries. However, neither of these positive point estimates is significantly different from 
zero assuming a 5% significance level. 22 
Table 5: Regressions on Total Factor Productivity 
Variable  I  II III IV V VI 


























Lagged share of large business employment 







___ ___ ___ 
Change of share of large business 







___ ___ ___ 
Lagged share of large business employment 
* Share of process innovators 






Change of share of large business 
employment * Share of process innovators 






N  247 228 247 247 228 247 
Adj.  R²  0.10 0.12 0.31 0.11 0.12 0.32 
Industry  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
White  (diagonal)  corrected  standard  errors  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 










*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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5.  Summary and Conclusions 
The results suggest that in industries with high competition and/or market selection, there is a 
positive effect of large business on productivity growth in the presence of innovation. This is 
especially true for process innovation. The latter result is in line with Cohen and Klepper’s 
(1996a, b) model of firm size and the nature of innovation. However, this positive effect is 
overshadowed by a negative impact of large business presence on productivity growth. 
Accompanying the fact that large firms’ organizational structures often are not supportive of 
innovation, is the bitter after-taste of large businesses in their role as successful lobbyists. 
Wealthy families, elite cadres of professional managers, or bureaucrats (in the case of state-
owned firms) often have control over large businesses and are well connected to politics. 
They thus have the power to lobby on behalf of weak institutions so as to preserve their 
concentrated control over the nation’s large businesses. This concentrated control over large 
businesses may lead to various market power distortions, particularly in regard to innovation. 
Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) call this state of affairs “oligarchic capitalism,” and 
state that when this situation exists, economic policy is no longer available as a cure for 
economic ills. The only way to break this stranglehold is to set up strong institutions that will 
prevent rent seeking. This is not a new conclusion—nor even a new solution to it—but as 
long as there is such a paucity of theoretical and empirical work aimed at the design of strong 
institutions, it is not a conclusion that can realistically be rewritten in a more hopeful form. 
Therefore, research and discussion on these issues should be intensified—theoretically and 
empirically—and the issue should be kept alive in political debate. 
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